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Climate induced migration became a recognized phenomenon. Due to the adverse effects of 
climate change, populations in certain affected areas will start to move either as a form of 
adaptation or because of failure to adapt thereof. The main questions raised are concerned with the 
rights of the people displaced. On the other hand, what obligations do states and the international 
community have to provide protection for these populations. This paper argues that climate 
migrants are not protected from both the causes and effects of climate change. The international 
environment governance system does not seem to have regulated the process that guarantees global 
environmental protection. On the other hand, if people start to move due to the effects of climate 
change, they will fall from the existing gaps in the international protection system. This paper also 
specifically looks at the moral dimension of the phenomenon of climate change, and presents why 
moral questioning is of value when dealing with such contentious issue. It also speaks to the no-
harm principle being a fundamental principle in international law and specifically to environmental 
law. Despite its importance, this principle is usually neglected when formulating policies on 
climate change. It argues that the no-harm principle was missing from the context of Paris 
Agreement, and thus kept the prospects of harm in place. It does this by its commitment to 
industrial growth and avoiding having emission reduction targets. As well, this paper discusses 
how climate migrants are not adequately addressed in Paris Agreement due to certain geopolitical 
settings, sustaining the possibility of them remaining highly vulnerable. This paper highlights legal 
and moral failure of the international society towards climate change at large and towards climate 
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I. Introduction  
Climate change is a major concern to the international community. Its impact on migration is 
increasingly becoming a matter of concern for researchers and policy makers. Even though the 
nexus between climate change and migration is still under scrutiny due to its nonlinear nature, and 
complexity of its relations. Climate change movement can be seen as a form of adaptation to a new 
situation, or because of failure to adapt. This movement is not clearly acknowledged in the 
international legal system. While the world has recognized other forms of movements such as the 
movement of economic migrants and refugees’, and coined international legal instruments to deal 
specifically with them. However, international law does not specifically recognize this movement 
induced by climate change. Nevertheless, climate migrants can still get ad hoc protection under 
international human rights law. As for litigation, it does not seem to have worked in their favor; 
accessing courts was not much of a success due to the need of resources that might not be available 
for climate migrants. Although human mobility is highly bound to international laws, climate 
migrants struggle to make an appearance in it.  
Climate change, as a phenomenon presents us with distinct challenges. The first one involves 
coping with the changing climate itself; for the societies who do not have the capacity to adapt to 
the new changes, the effects will be devastating. The effects will have ramifications in their social, 
economic and political systems; and could seep into the international system as well.  
The second challenge is climate change being seen a moral issue poses dramatic challenge to moral 
consciousness. What is of relevance to this paper is the connection to self-interest at one end and 
harm at the other end. Climate change is linked to the no harm principle on two levels: first is the 
theoretical, ethical and moral level, second is the international law level. Although the no-harm 
principle is reflected on both, it has rarely been invoked when shaping policies tackling climate 
change.  
From this stand, a brief assessment of the main aspects of the Paris Agreement will be carried out 
since it is the most recent international agreement concerning climate change. The assessment 
focuses on the absence of the no-harm principle from the agreement and how this will affect the 
endurance of the climate change problem, and will also have an effect on climate migrants.  
The paper highlights the legal and moral failure of the international society towards climate change 
at large and towards climate migrants in particular.  
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It is important to mention that this paper does not aim to propose what could be possible solutions 
to the climate migration problem. For the reason that the perception towards it is arguably one-
sided, being in fact produced by the causers of climate change not the affected ones. After all, 
migration might not be the solution sought by the victims of climate change.     
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II.  Climate Migrants and their place in the International Legal System  
The history of humankind is one of continuous migration; the environmental and climatic changes 
have been some of the reasons for peoples’ movement since the beginning of time.1  This chapter 
covers the broader issues of climate change and its related movement, and where this movement 
is positioned in the international legal system. It analyzes the existing international legal 
instruments that could provide protection to climate migrants. Under the assumption that this 
specific population has fallen through the protection nets of international law. It examines 
international refugee law, international law on migration, statelessness laws and customary 
international law. It also problematizes the aspect regarding the production of knowledge and the 
construction of the climate change problem, its related movement and the proposed solutions. It 
also examines the labelling of “climate refugees” and how this naming is perceived by the 
concerned people. 
A. The Effects of Climate Change  
It is now generally accepted that climate change will have widespread impact on both people and 
the environment, and that people will have to find adaptive measures to survive 2 including 
migration. In spite of it being widely discussed, there is, as yet, no solid forecast on the potential 
scope and the magnitude of the phenomenon.3 Predictions range from 200 to 250 million people 
on the move, rocketing to possibly a billion people moving by the middle of the 21st century for 
the more nightmarish predictions.4 It is believed that the least developed countries are going to be 
the first affected and the worst impacted in terms of climatic changes and production of migrants. 
Regions expected to produce the most climate migrants include Africa, heavily populated Asian 
mega delta areas, and small island nations located in the Pacific. 5   
For the purpose of understanding the scope of the climate change phenomenon and its entailing, 
multifaceted problem of climate induced migration, it is important to provide background on the 
effects of climate change. 
                                                          
1 Map of Human Migration, Genographic Project, available at: https://genographic.nationalgeographic.com/human-
journey/ (last visited Dec 21, 2016). 
2 Rafael Leal-Arcas, Climate Migrants: Legal Options, 37 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 86-96 (2012). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.    
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There are three main effects of climate change: an increase in temperatures, an increase in 
precipitation, and a rise in sea levels. Firstly, the total temperature increase from 1850–1899 to 
2001–2005 was 0.76°C (IPCC), and scientists expect that the average global surface temperature 
could continue to rise by 1-3.5°C by 2100, with significant regional variation.6 
Most of the warming is believed to have been caused by human interference and industrialization 
activities such as the burning of oil, coal and other fuels that release carbon dioxide, as well as 
other Greenhouse Gases (GHG). As a consequence, the mass of ice in the Northern Hemisphere 
and in the Arctic Ocean are shrinking.7 The anthropogenic interference is mainly important 
because it associates the responsibility for the changes to the developed nations as major 
contributors to the problem, and thus obliged to provide adequate reparations for the harm done.  
Secondly, as the climate warms, evaporation will increase, which will increase average global 
precipitation, with ranges of variation by region. Soil moisture is likely to decline in many regions, 
and intense rainstorms are likely to become more frequent. 8  
Thirdly, globally, sea levels have risen 4-10 inches over the past century as a consequence of global 
warming, due to the melting of glaciers. There are variations on the effect of rising sea levels 
depending on the region. It could contaminate the aquifers that supply drinking water to the 
Caribbean islands, while entire Pacific island nations might simply disappear under the sea.9  
As a result of these climate changes, people have already begun to move, and this movement is 
likely to increase in the future. This climate induced displacement has serious consequences on 
many levels as will be discussed in the coming pages. Most of the movement is likely to be an 
internal one. However for the ones who have no option but to move from their own country to 
another, will have no right to enter host countries.  
Looking at the leading causes of climate induced migration helps to clarify the phenomenon. Five 
types of problems have been identified: sudden-onset disasters such as flooding or storms, slow-
onset disasters such as rising sea levels and increased salination of freshwater, sinking small island 
States which are perhaps a special case of a slow-onset disaster, governments designating areas as 
                                                          
6 Id.      
7 Id.      
8 Id.      
9  Id.      
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high-risk zones too dangerous for human habitation on account of environmental dangers, and 
unrest seriously disturbing public order, violence or even armed conflict resulting from the 
depletion of natural resources due to the effects of climate change. 10  
Generally, it is the extremely poor who will be the most severely impacted by climate change. 
Their vulnerability arises by virtue of their own poverty; poverty affects their resilience and highly 
affects their adaptability. It also affects their ability to move, since movement needs access to 
resources whether monetary or access to information. Usually, it is the worst off who become stuck 
in a depleting environment.11 It is also worth mentioning that even if we lived in an equal world, 
the impact of climate change will still have distinct regional variations; making certain areas more 
prone to experience more adverse effects of climate change than others. 
B. Climate Change, climate induced migration and legal 
contestation  
There have been many options under international law that were proposed to deal with peoples’ 
movement. These include Refugee Convention of 1951, international law on migration, 
statelessness laws and international human rights law. However, arguably none of them seem 
adequately designed to fit the protection of people moving due to the effects of climate change.  
Some commentators have suggested that the existing treaties and institutions suffice to address 
climate adaptation; however these treaties arguably will not solve the humanitarian issue.12  
If victims of climate change are forced to resettle, some argue that they should be able to recover 
damages for harms received.  
There are several possible legal bases for the establishment of a violation of international law, 
nevertheless not necessarily guaranteeing results. These include breaches of treaty claims under 
the UNFCCC, the human right of self-determination, the duty under the Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage to preserve natural and cultural heritage, 
and UNCLOS protections against ocean acidification.13 Under customary international law, every 
state has an obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts that are contrary to 
                                                          
10 Id.         
11 Id.      
12 Id.      
13 Id.       
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the rights of other states. This requires states to refrain from using their territory in a way that 
causes environmental harm beyond their borders.14 
C. What protection?   
My interest in this topic was sparked by the implications of climate change that my hometown 
Alexandria, Egypt is experiencing. Like many delta systems, the coastal zone of the Nile delta has 
been designated as a vulnerable zone to a rising sea level as a consequence of expected climate 
changes combined with geological and human factors.15 Risks of displacements are likely to occur 
as well.16  
Nonetheless, the main focus of this paper is concerned with the protection of climate migrants in 
case they cross an international border. For the reason that, if they are internally displaced they 
would still have some options of protection from normative frameworks like protection as an 
internally displaced person or under humanitarian aid modalities. On the contrary, if displacement 
occurs across an international border, the protection options will arguably not be applicable to this 
specific situation; identification of a duty holder to a population moving due to the effects of 
climate change will not be easily recognized by states. 
Before proposing protection options under international law towards climate change induced 
migrants, it is useful to identify, what kind of protection there is. Ideally, protection would happen 
in three stages: before, during and after displacement. 17 
Protection, can be defined as both a material commodity such as shelter and a set of processes or 
actions which may be responsive; reducing imminent, life-threatening risks, remedial; restoring 
rights after a disaster or displacement, and proactive; enhancing dignity of treatment and advocacy 
for environmentally displaced people. Protection as a process or action intrinsically derives from, 
and is underpinned by, law and legal concepts. 18   
                                                          
14 Jane McAdam, Climate change, forced migration, and international law (Oxford University Press) (2012). 
15 J. McInnis, S. Singh & I. Huq, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change (2016), 
http://link.springer.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/article/10.1007%2Fs11027-015-9682-8 (last visited May 2, 
2017). 
16 H. ElSharkawy, I. Rached & H. Rached, Climate Change: The Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Egypt (2009). 
17 Roger Zetter, Protecting environmentally displaced people: developing the capacity of legal and normative 
frameworks Rsc.ox.ac.uk (2017), available at https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/protecting-environmentally-
displaced-people-developing-the-capacity-of-legal-and-normative-frameworks (last visited Mar 25, 2017).  
18 Id. 
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D. Conceptual framework of climate migration phenomenon  
It is important to highlight a distinct feature of climate change related movement; Jane McAdam 
among other scholars stress on the fact that it is inherently fraught to speak of climate change as 
“the” cause of human movement, even though its impacts may exacerbate existing socioeconomic 
or environmental vulnerabilities. Rather, climate change will have an incremental impact adding 
to existing problems and compound existing threats. 19 
Migration can be a strategy of adaptation to climate change. The complexity of migration decision 
and the interconnectedness of environmental economic, social and political factors make it 
virtually impossible to provide an accurate estimate of people who actually “move” because of 
climate change.20 Although the exact number of people that will be on the move by mid-century 
is uncertain, the scope and scale could vastly exceed anything that has occurred before.21 
The growing body of empirical research shows that in most cases, climate change related 
movement is likely to be predominantly internal and/or gradual. This accords with migration 
patterns generally, which indicate that while there are around 200 million international migrants, 
there are approximately 740 million internal migrants. 22  
 
There will be some cross border movement on account of the climate change impacts, however 
not in the magnitude often predicted. Since the bigger mass of movement is internal, is it likely to 
remain an invisible phenomenon in bureaucratic and international legal terms. The construction of 
the problem substantially shapes the legal and policy interventions. Basically, migration can be 
seen either way; a sign of adaptation or failure to adapt.23  
 
Although some communities have turned to migration in order to cope with climatic changes, 
nowadays it is particularly troubling because of its speed, frequency and scale and needless to say 
the number of people it is poised to affect. What is particularly troubling is that this phenomenon 
is affecting primarily developing countries; the rate and scale of climate induced migration will 
exhaust the traditional adaptive capacity of many human communities, placing them in vulnerable 
                                                          
19 Supra note 14 
20 Id. 
21 Michel Prieur et al., Draft convention on the international status of environmentally- displaced persons (2008). 
22 Supra note 14 
23 Id. 
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positions and with limited mobility options. The irony confronting developing states is that, though 
they have contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions, they will ultimately bear the bigger 
chunk of the burden.24 For those facing environmental displacement, migration has become a 
“survival mechanism of last resort.” 25 
 
The affected people face a two-fold injustice; they have not primarily contributed to the problem 
of climate change, however they are paying the price of the development of other countries. Yet, 
they do not have a protection mechanism if a decision to migrate is taken.   
E. Is leaving a choice?  
There is another aspect regarding climate induced migration that generally relates to choosing 
and/or shaping legal or policy discourse that is the nature of the movement itself. It involves 
whether the migration is voluntary or forced, temporary or permanent and whether this movement 
is internal or across an international border. Of these, the first is especially complex in relation to 
slow-onset climate change. 26  A progressive form of rights protection norms is advocated to take 
account of the transition from migration which may start as a voluntary process, however may 
become involuntary or forced where permanent depletion of resources render livelihoods 
impossible. 27 
Human movement is theorized as continuum, with two almost indistinguishable splits of forced 
migration at one end, and voluntary migration at the other. The degree of compulsion or choice is 
what pushes people to take the decision to move. However, international protection regime will 
arguably favor those who move involuntarily and their protection is premised as the responsibility 
of other states, extending legal protection under international law, possibly under non-refoulement 
obligations.28  
Voluntary migration by contrast does not activate international legal duties beyond the states’ 
obligation under human rights law. The state basically owes protection to all of the people within 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Xing-Yin Ni, A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for “Climate Change Refugees”, 38 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 329 (2015), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol38/iss2/7 
26 Supra note 14 
27 Supra note 17 
28 Supra note 14 
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its territory falling under its jurisdiction; however it does not have an obligation to extend it 
further.29 In other words, they can still be deported if the state demands so. 
This neat categorization of movement reveals an enormous degree of complexity in decision 
making. Slow onset impacts of climate change, in particular, pose a challenge to the traditional 
understanding of “forced” migration. People may have no prospect of a sustainable livelihood if 
they remain in their home, as they may not appear to be facing an imminent harm.30 
It can be said that the nature of the movement stands on highly fluid grounds. Categorically, it is 
not exactly forced yet not entirely voluntary either. The availability of options erodes. Leaving 
them with the plausible option of migration to preserve their existence and possibly provide them 
with another opportunity to establish a livelihood elsewhere.  
These conceptual issues result in the lack of uniform terminology used to describe people who 
move in response to impacts of climate change. The fact that there is still no internationally  
agreed-upon definition of what it means to be an environmental migrant, refugee or displaced 
person makes it difficult to systematically progress deliberations about appropriate multilateral 
legal and institutional responses.31 It seems that the international legal system has imposed legal 
recognition indeterminacy upon this population. Whether this is deliberate or not, the 
consequences of “ad hoc” protection will continue to leave this population in this legal and 
physical limbo.  
 
F. An invisible population  
Generally, there is no international consensus on the definition of people on the move. Climate 
migrants are no different, since there is no consensus on the definition of “climate” or 
“environmental migrants.” 32  
In 2001, Richard Black complained that there are abundant typologies of “environmental refugees” 
and “environmental migrants” however there is no agreement, nor concrete understanding of what 
these categories really mean. Some literature have attempted to clarify the definitions during the 
                                                          
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Benoît Mayer, International Law And Climate Migrants: A Human Rights Perspective (2011).  
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last ten years, however it remains unclear because of the lack of an official or a widely accepted 
definition.33 Generally, the notion of “climate migrant” coexists with that of "environmental 
migrants." However, the IOM defines environmental migrants as those who:  
for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely 
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose 
to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or 
abroad.34 
Adopting a pragmatic approach, this definition indiscriminately includes people displaced by 
climatic events as well as by climatic processes, moving permanently or temporarily, those who 
have made the choice to move and the ones who were forced to move; it puts all the effects and 
those affected in one basket. 35 
The focus of this paper is on those moving as climate migrants and not environmental migrants, 
people only moving due to the effect of global climate change as opposed to those moving due to 
any changes in the environment. This nuance is important because climate migration inflicts 
responsibility upon the international community that has caused climate change, and sometimes 
even stays silent on its proliferation. 36 
On the other hand, there is another term that is used to describe people displaced due to climate 
changes: climate refugees. McAdam states that it was first used in an international bureaucratic 
discourse in a report to the UNEP by El-Hinnawi in 1985. This term was to describe people forced 
to leave their traditional habitat temporarily or permanently because of marked environmental 
disruption whether natural/and or triggered by people that jeopardized their existence or seriously 
affected their quality of life.37 El-Hinnawi used the language of refugee to draw attention to the 
damaging effects of anthropogenic climate change on human settlement rather than to advocate 
for the extension of the international protection regime to people displaced by it. 38  
Karen McNamara, on the other hand, states that the emergence of the term “environmental 
refugee” can be dated back to nuclear testing in the post Second World War. The first document 
                                                          
33 Id.   
34 Definitional Issues, International Organization for Migration, available at https://www.iom.int/definitional-issues 
(last visited May 2, 2017). 
35 Supra note 32  
36 Id.   
37 Supra note 14 
38 Id.  
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found explicitly identifying “climate refugees” was published by the Worldwatch Institute in 1988. 
This Institute is an NGO that conducts research into the interactions between environmental, social 
and economic issues. In that document it was explained that local disruptions such as avalanches 
or earthquakes, chemical contamination, land degradation, climate change and sea level rise all 
cause refugee movements. 39 
There is no doubt that the term “refugee” is of an alarming weight in the international arena 
because of the history behind it and the legacy it carries. This maybe the reason why this term has 
been chosen to describe these people rather than any other one. From McAdam’s point of view El-
Hinnawi was not trying to mount any legal or even ethical argument about the extension of refugee 
law to people displaced for environmental reasons, rather it was to highlight the potential 
devastation caused by anthropogenic climatic changes and the resulting movement. Thus, refugee 
language was used as a tool for advocacy. 40 
The misplacing of the term “refugee” to a population that does not necessarily fall under this 
category, for advocacy reasons is rejected by forced migration scholars. While it might generate 
attention and mobilize action, it can also contribute to misunderstanding about the likely pattern, 
timescale and nature of climate change related movement.41  
 
G. Problematizing the notion of climate refugees  
Before turning to the existing legal instruments available to climate migrants, it is important to 
shed light on how different individuals, organizations and media perceive and translate information 
on this subject into their own thinking. Thus, it could be relevant to pay critical attention to the 
way climate change is portrayed and fed to the masses.42  
As stated before, a lot of labels and discursive categories have been associated with climate change 
and its related movement in which processes, people and phenomenon has been squeezed to fit.  
                                                          
39 Karen Elizabeth McNamara & Chris Gibson, ‘We do not want to leave our land’: Pacific ambassadors at the United 
Nations resist the category of ‘climate refugees’, 40 Geoforum 475-483 (2009). 
40 Supra note 14 
41 Id.  
42 Supra note 39 
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“Polluter”, “problem”, “adaptation”, “climate friendly”, “mitigation”, “clean coal” and “solutions” 
are just some examples; and the long list goes on. 43 
Some of these categories have quickly come to assume “common sense” or “naturalized” meaning. 
Understanding the emergence of these categories and their underlying cultural and political 
meanings is thus crucial, not just for the “truth-claims” they may support (or alternative truths they 
shroud from view). Rather, understanding the etymology and effect of these categories makes a 
difference because they generate their own altered realities, set the terms of debates, change 
political landscapes and shift power relationships among people, institutions and non-human 
entities. 44  
The category of “climate refugees” is a particular discursive category into which certain groups of 
people have increasingly been placed as the climate change debate has escalated, although it has 
no legal basis. What is important, is how leaders from the Pacific Islands who represent some of 
the affected populations responded to such categorizations, by untangling the multiple threads of 
geopolitical meaning about the future associated with it. 45 
The position of the populations severely affected by climate change, and the exposure of the 
geopolitical meaning of their arguments can be seen in interviews conducted with Pacific small 
islands states ambassadors in 2004. These interviews reveal the views of the endangered Pacific 
island states towards the term they were being called by: “climate refugees”. Not surprisingly, the 
subject category of “climate refugees” was strongly resisted by Pacific ambassadors; adamant and 
articulating their own identities as sovereign people 46 in spite of risking possible future legal 
recognition of their human rights.47 It is a case that highlights the fluidity of meanings surrounding 
climate change categories and the perils of constructing political arguments based on discourses 
of victimhood.48 The dominant view of the Ambassadors was different from those of the 
mainstream discourse.  
                                                          
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
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For the Ambassadors, climate change must be controlled to prevent them from having to leave 
their lands. Exodus was simply not part of an acceptable future scenario for them.49  
The subtext to this narrative is that the people affected were weak, passive victims with little 
internal resilience to fight for much more than relocation. The geopolitical context was mainly 
reluctance from industrialized countries to accept climate change as a problem; hence depictions 
of entire countries disappearing beneath the sea performed a particular function that is contributing 
to a counter-discourse, problematizing inaction by western governments on climate change.50   
In relation to these environmental injustices, Pacific islanders ought to have been given protection 
and options to legally resettle elsewhere away from the apocalyptic future environmental 
scenario.51 
Basically, Pacific Island leaders urged international leaders not to make decisions for them in their 
fight against climate change, stating as well that they do not want to become people on the move, 
neither do they want to see their lands eroded, or economies destroyed, nor their lands drown. They 
wanted the assistance of the more affluent nations and international community to help them in 
that fight.52 These ambassadors avoided welcoming migration, for it would have sent the message 
that they had effectively given up on mitigation measures to avert future impacts of climate 
change.53 More importantly, they wanted to stress on the fact that that they have been threatened 
by the effects of climate change not because of something they caused themselves, but that was 
caused by the deliberate actions or inactions of other countries.  
They also demanded that such an imposed identity be replaced with an acknowledgement of them 
as citizens of sovereign, independent nations, a homeland from which people did not wish to flee 
by becoming “climate refugees”. This was a reaffirmation of the stance of the affected people in 
the face of mainstream discourses produced by organizations and people who not part of the 
problem and having the audacity to suggest measures of adaptation that were not adopted by the 
people involved. 54  
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It can be concluded that at the heart of the contestation over the category of “climate refugees” is 
a geopolitical tension between visions of the future. The vision for the future validating the 
category of “climate refugees” is based on Pacific islands being perceived as weaker, marginal 
nations having to adapt in the most extreme way to problems created by large, polluting nations 
rather than those polluting nations curbing their own emissions as “The solution”. In contrast, 
Pacific nation ambassadors envision a future as self-determining nation-states, and thus, strongly 
resist policy discourses that legitimize their possible future displacement en masse. 55  
Although these ambassadors as an example of climate change induced migrants might not be a 
representation of the category of climate migrants as a whole, it does give insight into how the 
formulation of the problem and its categorization is inherently an inadequate representation of the 
viewpoint of the populations involved. It is a possibility that the islands’ situation is different 
because their lands are going to be inhabitable or disappear entirely in the worst scenario. 
However, these ambassadors had the chance to convey the point of view of the actual people facing 
the reality of climate change on the ground and in its most violent mode. This proposition does not 
necessarily deny that migration could be a reality and a possible option when the effects of climate 
change make a land uninhabitable.  
However, the situation of the islanders was a needed intervention to demonstrate how the shaping 
of the problems and proposed solutions are not necessarily in harmony with the actual problem on 
the ground. The following section will assess the legal instruments and identifies gaps which leave 
climate migrants unprotected.  
 
H. International legal protection and identified gaps 
It is obvious that climate change poses significant challenges to international law. This is because 
issues regarding climate change permeate national boundaries, and defy the structure of how the 
world operates. Emissions or actions in one state can have adverse effects in other ones, areas 
which these states have no jurisdiction over 56 not to mention how climate change effects transcend 
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the time factor as well; emissions take time to materialize in the atmosphere, posing a more 
complex problem with both a temporal and spatial dimension as will be explained ahead.  
This paper argues that the populations who will suffer the consequences linked to climate change 
relating to displacement do not have special legal protection under international law. However, the 
principles of international human rights law, refugee law, statelessness laws and general 
international law, principles of dignity humanity and international cooperation provide normative 
framework which underpin a variety of legal and policy strategies.57  
In addition, there is a number of “soft laws” issued regarding internally displaced people that could 
be applied to climate migrants, to mention: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
However, its scope of application is relatively narrow, and there is a number of obstacles that could 
hinder its implementation.  
I. International law on migration 
The regulation of migration is one of the processes that affirm state sovereignty and power over a 
state’s borders. Arguably, because migration is an issue that invokes sensitivities, and states deal 
with it on its own terms. This is probably why legally binding instruments related to migration are 
unpopular in terms of number of signatories compared to other instruments.  
Despite migration issues being under the international spotlight currently and despite all of the 
crises taking place, there is still no uniform definition of what a migrant is. However, the IOM has 
formulated a definition that describes a migrant as: 
any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State 
away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; 
(2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the 
movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. 58 
 
One of the conventions that is turned to for protection of climate migrants is The International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. 
However, this instrument is not adequate for the protection of climate migrants because it mainly 
                                                          
57 Supra note 14 
58 Who is a migrant? International Organization for Migration, https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant (last visited 
May 3, 2017). 
 16 
recalls internationally recognized human rights in the specific case of migrant workers or aliens. 
Its low rate of ratification shows that few states are keen to recognize and protect even the basic 
human rights in the case of economic migrants. In other words, the status of “migrant” does not 
provide climate migrant with any additional protection.59  
The Convention restates many of the rights provided under other, more general human rights 
instruments, including the right to life and freedom from torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in Part III. Article 64 of The Convention requires that 'the States’ Parties 
concerned shall as appropriate consult and co-operate with a view to promoting sound, equitable 
and humane conditions in connection with international migration of workers and members of 
their families’. 60 
On the other hand, the same convention under article 79 gives the right to state parties over the 
control of the admission process to set criteria that govern admission of the migrants and their 
families. This broad protection could have far reaching consequences for those who migrate to 
find employment from a place made uninhabitable by climate change.61 
Similarly, Article 22 controls the expulsion process; migrant workers cannot be collectively 
expelled, and if they are to be expelled it has to be undertaken by a competent authority and in 
accordance with the rules of procedural fairness, unless compelling reasons of national security 
suggest otherwise. In such a procedure, a migrant worker could potentially raise the environmental 
conditions in their country of origin as a factor to be taken into account by the decision-maker 
considering their expulsion. 62 
In spite of these indications, the Convention is silent as to the weight that may be given to such 
consideration. It is unlikely that this Convention would provide protection for many, if any, of 
those who flee internationally because of environmental factors and who arrive in another state 
because of their employment. 63  
 
                                                          
59 Supra note 32 
60 Id.  
61 Supra note 17 
62 Supra note 17 
63 Id.  
 17 
J. International Refugee Law  
Some consider turning to the Refugee Convention of 1951, to seek protection for displaced people 
from climate change. However, many have argued against this proposition. Some have raised 
historical reasons; stating that this Convention responds to the post-war context, and ecological 
catastrophes were not on the agenda, even if there had already been natural disasters, it does not 
even appear in the Travaux Préparatoires of the Convention.64 
Most importantly, there are insurmountable legal barriers to invoke this Convention. The 
environment does not appear as a cause of migration, and Article 1 requires that the person 
claiming refugee status be the victim of “persecution”; and to establish an argument that proves 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, social group or political 
opinion. It is exceptionally difficult to assimilate natural disasters into a new form of persecution, 
even if some have made the effort to do so.   
The term “refugee” is a legal term with highly specific features. The Refugee Convention sets out 
all the rights and the entitlements of a refugee.65 Article 1(A) (2) of the 1951 Convention defines 
a refugee as a person who: 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
First, as per the definition, a refugee is recognized as someone who has crossed an international 
border. As stated before, the movement caused by climate change is going to be mostly internal, 
not necessarily moving and crossing an international border, thus this requirement arguably will 
not be fulfilled by most of the people moving due to climate change. However, this does not deny 
the right of protection for the fewer numbers that are going to be internationally displaced, who 
are the main focus of this paper.  
                                                          
64 Supra note 32 
65 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Climate Change Displacement and International Law: 
Complementary Protection Standards, 1 May 2011, PPLA/2011/03, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fdf20022.html [accessed 5 May 2017] 
 18 
The second is the matter of proving an occurrence of persecution. There is difficulty in the 
characterization of climate change as such. Persecution entails violations of human rights and is 
sufficiently serious because of their inherent nature or because of their repetition (accumulation of 
breaches that are not individually serious however, by putting them together constitute a serious 
violation).66  
Even if the impact of climate change could be considered as persecution, the Refugee Convention 
has set requirements on their account an individual’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group. In other words, persecution alone is not enough; 
discrimination must also be present. This is unlikely, as climate change impacts are indiscriminate; 
and not targeted at a certain background, belief or race.  
Even the argument that some have put forward that the people affected by its impact could 
constitute a “particular social group” would still be difficult to establish, because the law requires 
that the group must be connected by a fundamental, immutable characteristic other than the risk of 
persecution itself. 67  
There are two other points that arise in the context of a refugee as identified in the Convention. 
First is the point of the state as a persecutor and the second is the motivation or intent. In the flight 
of a refugee outside his/her country, it is because of a situation of persecution done by the state 
and inflicted on a person. On the other hand, the climate as “persecutor” is indiscriminate in its 
“persecution”; it does not recognize who is against the state and who is not; it affects in an 
undifferentiating manner.  
One might argue that the “persecutor” in cases of environmental displacement in developing 
countries, is the “international community”, and industrialized countries in particular, whose 
continuous emissions have led to the problem being faced; these are the very countries in which 
movement might be sought if the land becomes unsustainable. 68 
As McAdam states, that it is considered as a complete reversal of the traditional refugee paradigm, 
whereas Convention refugees flee their own government (or private actors that the government is 
unable or unwilling to protect them from), a person fleeing the effects of climate change is not 
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escaping his or her government rather is seeking refuge from and yet within countries that have 
contributed to climate change, or possible any other country that is nearest to them. This presents 
yet another problem in terms of the legal definition of “refugee” in the case of countries severely 
affected such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, the government remains willing to protect its citizens, 
although the extent of its ability to do so over time is unclear. 69 
The assessment of the future harm in the Refugee Convention to the climate induced migration 
might be another aspect that hinders the application of the 1951 Convention. This assessment of 
risk of potential future harm requires evidence of an actual threat even though it is not a 
requirement for a refugee claim to be substantiated; it is an anticipatory flight. However, refugee 
jurisprudence has clear limits on how preemptive flight may be. The plausibility and reasonability 
of fear is a must in all circumstances, while the assessment of the risk of persecution is prospective 
with the risk of harm being even less than a fifty percent chance.70 This includes consideration for 
the relation between the nature of persecution feared and the degree of likelihood of its happening. 
It is this element of time that poses particular difficulties for preemptive movement away from the 
slow onset impacts of climate change. 71 
Consequently, protection is premised on the fact that the person is compelled to leave because of 
it. This preemptive protection like the one provided here is limited in cases of environmental or 
climatic changes that stretch over long intervals of time like desertification.72  
What poses even a greater difficulty in extending this instrument to populations affected by climate 
change, is the impossibility of isolating underlying stressors and identifying climate change as a 
cause of an individual extreme weather event. This is why it is almost impossible to establish a 
link between climate change and the reason for individual flight. 73 
Lastly, there remain limited exceptions where exposure to climate impacts or environmental 
degradation might amount to persecution for a Convention reason. If a government specifically 
targets a certain population by using for example induced famine by destroying crops or poisoning 
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water, or contributed to environmental destruction by polluting the land and/or water. In this case 
the affected people might argue for protection based on a Convention reason.74 
It is important to include how courts have dealt with the issue of climate change related 
displacement. Superior courts around the world have explained that the Refugee Convention does 
not extend or cover individuals looking for better living conditions, nor the victims of natural 
disasters whose states are unable to provide them with assistance, even though they seem to 
deserve international sanctuary. 75 
The High Court of Australia has stated that the requirement of “persecution” limits the 
Convention’s “humanitarian scope” and does not afford universal protection to asylum seekers. 
The devastation caused by such natural disasters, famine or an epidemic is not relevant; a person 
fleeing such circumstances is not considered a refugee within the terms of the Convention; they 
fall outside the scope. 76 
People from climate change affected places like Tuvalu and Kiribati have tried to file court cases 
albeit small in number in Australia and New Zealand, arguing to receive refugee protection from 
climate change impact. Applicants from Tonga and Bangladesh have sought protection on the basis 
of natural disasters. Apparently, the have all failed, this paper will demonstrate an example of these 
failed cases; as will be shown ahead from the famous case of Teitiota from Kiribati. 77  
Similarly, The House of Lords observed the limited scope and objectives of the Convention not 
providing protection in cases of threats to life due to famine, civil war or isolated acts of violence. 
Even if the applicant may have a well-founded fear of the previously mentioned threats, no matter 
how well-founded the fear is, it does no entitle the applicant to the status of a refugee.78 
In conclusion, international refugee law is a cumbersome framework for addressing flight from 
climate change related impact. Its design and the original context it was made for in most cases is 
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inadequate for responding to climate change induced movement.79 What stands out is, first, that 
the bulk of the movement is going to be internal not crossing an international border, and second, 
it does not fit adequately in the time dimension of preemptive movement.80 
 
K. Statelessness Conventions  
Even though it might look like a far-fetched option, some have turned to the international legal 
system for the protection of the cases of statelessness, in the hopes that it could be applied to some 
climate migrants.81 This option raises many questions on the nature of “statehood” itself having to 
have a territory, a population and a government to enter with relations with others. The question 
is whether the state ceases to exist if any of these is missing. It is uncertain whether these conditions 
must be respected continuously after the state has been recognized. 82  
It is likely that the populations who are going to invoke these Conventions are the Pacific Islands 
states that are foreseen to be eventually submerged under the sea or at least to be uninhabitable.  
Without going into detail of the legal dimensions of what constitutes a , and whether it may still 
virtually exist even after it is submerged, the important thing to mention is that international law 
does not provide stateless persons with a plethora of rights and in particular does not grant the right 
to enter a territory.83  
The Convention relating to stateless persons ratified by only 66 states, prohibits the expulsion of 
stateless persons except on the grounds of national security or public order; however this is only 
under the condition of lawful stay in the territory. 84 At the same time, the notion of the reduction 
of statelessness may provide the affected climate migrants with an argument for naturalization. 
For these reasons this instrument might not be the foreseen tool for the protection of climate 
migrants.  
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L. International Human Rights Law  
Another potential source of international legal protection for climate migrants is found in 
international human rights law. The reason why it is important to the present analysis is because 
it, firstly, sets out minimum standards of treatment that states must accord to individuals residing 
within their territory or jurisdiction. Secondly, if the rights of these populations are violated, the 
human rights law may provide a legal basis on which protection might be sought in another state. 
Lastly, if relocation occurs human rights law requires minimum standards of treatment in the host 
state.85 
Obviously, submersion of one’s entire country, flooding, desertification, or a significant increase 
of natural hazards have consequences on fundamental, widely recognized threats to rights such as 
the right to life, but also economic and social rights and possibly third generation human rights, 
such as the right to security. However, if climate migrants’ rights are well established, there are 
obstacles to the identification of the corollary duty holders. Under international human rights law, 
a state has the responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens and any other person 
within its jurisdiction. States do not have any human rights obligations to other countries’ citizens 
who are not under their “effective control.” 86 Therefore, crossing out another potential source of 
international protection for climate migrants. 
 
M. Non-refoulement  
Non-refoulement is a concept which prohibits states from returning a refugee or asylum seeker to 
territories where there is a risk that his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. This does 
not mean that this concept relates only to refugees, since there are, other contexts in which Non-
refoulement is relevant, notably, in the more general law relating to human rights concerning the 
prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 87 
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This principle is defined in a in a number of international instruments relating to refugees, both at 
the universal and regional levels. On the universal level mention should first be made of the 1951 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of refugees, which, in Article 33(1), provides 
that: 
 No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
 whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
 account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
 political opinion. 88 
What is of relevance, is the protection that can also be given outside the Refugee convention, as 
prescribed in human rights treaties under international human rights law. States are bound not to 
transfer any individual to another country if this would result in exposure to human rights 
violations, notably arbitrary deprivation of life, or torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment as prescribed in the Convention Against Torture and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, proving that climate change displacement would 
result in deprivation of life, or can amount to a threshold of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment is arguably key to ensure non-refoulement.  
The absence of formal instruments creating legal rights for climate-induced migrants has led 
scholars to look into numerous avenues. Another possible source of protection lies in custom. 
Needless to mention that customary international law is legally binding, created through the pattern 
and practice of states over time and motivated by opinio juris; a sense of legal obligation.89 
In fact, custom can form at a regional level and become binding but only for states in that region. 
Hence, the practice of “specifically affected states” is of particular significance. Just as a series of 
harms can rise to the level of persecution under refugee law, a series of actions by Pacific states 
for example to protect environmentally displaced individuals could rise to the level of regional 
custom. 90 However, this limits the protection by region and does not necessarily endow protection 
to the populations outside of it.  
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It remains a source of controversy whether states have obligations under custom to protect 
individuals who fall outside the Refugee Convention. A number of scholars contend that the 
principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the forced return of individuals to countries in which 
they are at risk of serious human rights violations, has developed into a customary international 
norm. 91  
Meanwhile, others criticize such contentions as “wishful legal thinking” and argue that non-
refoulement does not exist under customary international law. Even if recognized as custom, it 
remains to be seen whether the non-refoulement obligation would offer protection to individuals 
fleeing climate change. 92   
 
N. Complementary protection  
This section examines the standards of complementary protection and whether it offers protection 
options to those forcibly displaced across international borders as a result of climate change 
induced events.93  
Complementary protection is a generic term that describes the protection that results from an 
international legal obligation not to return a person to serious ill-treatment such as torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This protection is accorded to a person that is not 
considered under the Refugee Convention, but still cannot be returned to his country of origin 
under the expanded notion and obligation of non-refoulement under international human rights 
law. 94 
Judicial bodies have found that obligations to grant complementary protection arise under  
Article 3 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and Articles 6 and 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), among other instruments. 95 
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Displacement due to climate or environmental changes do not meet the international definition of 
torture, which is defined as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public official 
for an enumerated purpose such as punishment or obtaining a confession. 96 
Virtually, there is no doubt that the movement of people due to climate changes is a horrendous 
event by its mere nature. However, it is legally difficult to define these climatic events that are 
causing people to migrate as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. This is because 
it requires actual bodily coercion or intense physical or mental suffering. Degrading treatment 
means the humiliating or debasing of an individual and his or her human dignity. This treatment 
requires a motive, on the contrary, climate changes are a completely different case; the effects of 
climate changes are intent-free and indiscriminate. Due to the inexistence of such factors the case 
of people moving due to climatic factors, the complementary protection by non-refoulement might 
not apply. 97 
Courts have carefully circumscribed the meaning of “inhuman or degrading treatment” so that it 
cannot be used as a remedy for general poverty, unemployment, or lack of resources or medical 
care except in the most exceptional circumstances.98 
The key rights to consider in the complementary protection context are: the right to life sometimes 
expressed in the removal context as the right not to be subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life; 
and the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
While these are not necessarily the only rights which encompass a non-refoulement obligation, 
they are the two which are clearly recognized in international law as giving rise to such an 
obligation, and which have been incorporated into a number of domestic complementary 
protection regimes. 99 
Similarly, Article 7 of the ICCPR which enshrines additional protection might be difficult, even 
in the events of severest and most destructive environmental catastrophe, as it is unlikely to amount 
to torture. This places protection from refoulement out of the reach in all but the most exceptional 
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cases. Furthermore, a State’s general lack of resources cannot be used to justify a breach of  
Article 3. 100 
O. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an internally 
displaced person (IDPs). 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an internally displaced person (IDP) was 
developed by the UNHCR in 1998. For those who face violent conflicts, gross violations of human 
rights and related causes in which discrimination features significantly, displacement generates 
conditions of severe hardship and suffering for the affected populations. The Guiding Principles 
were also evoked to protect those internally displaced by environmental disasters. Principle 15 
provides that IDPs have: 
(a) The right to seek safety in another part of the country;  (b) The right to leave their 
country; (c) The right to seek asylum in another country; and (d) The right to be protected 
against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or 
health would be at risk. Although they are formally recognized by many international 
organizations and appear in a number of international agreements, the Guiding Principles, 
as a soft-law instrument, are not binding under international law.  
Although the said guiding principles may seem like an adequate instrument for the protection of 
climate change induced persons, there are a number of factors that impose difficulty on such a 
proposition.  
The first difficulty is that the guiding principles as such are not a binding instrument that could be 
ratified by States. At the same time, the they reflec,t and are consistent with international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law, as set out in the Annotations to the Guiding 
Principles. To the extent that States have ratified the human rights and humanitarian instruments 
upon which the Guiding Principles are based, they are bound by the corresponding principles. 
States also can opt, as some have done, to make them binding by incorporating them into their 
domestic law. 101 
The second difficulty involves the national authorities that have the primary duty and responsibility 
to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their jurisdiction. As seen in 
Guiding Principle 3(1) International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have 
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the right, and many argue the responsibility, to offer protection of and assistance to the internally 
displaced where their state is unwilling or unable to.102 Since most displacements are expected to 
take place within developing states they are usually unable to extend this protection due to their 
lack of capacity and resources.  
Although the Guiding principles are accepted as being a valuable tool for protection, there are 
several significant limitations that hinder their application. The most important limitation is them 
being non-binding, as well there being no effective measures of international enforcement 
mechanism that ensures their proper application. 103 
 
P. Taking climate refugees to court  
The visibility of climate migration as a phenomenon is still relatively new in the international 
arena. Therefore, only few cases have actually forced their way into the court system arguing for 
the need of protection. One well-known case is the one of Teitiota; a Kiribati citizen who argued 
for refugee status in New Zealand on the basis of environmental factors.  
This New Zealand case that involves an application for refugee status based on the effects of 
climate change in the Pacific Island nation of Kiribati has received media attention around the 
world. The proceedings in the case came to an end in July 2015 when the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand, the highest court in the country, dismissed an application for leave to appeal the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in which it ruled against the applicant. 104 
Mr. Teitiota and his wife moved to New Zealand from Kiribati in 2007, and resided illegally after 
the expiration of their visas. In order to avoid deportation, Mr. Teitiota filed for refugee status 
under Part 5 of the Immigration Act 2009, on the basis of changes to his environment in Kiribati 
caused by sea-level-rise associated with climate change.105 Not surprisingly, after lengthy 
procedures between the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, and The High Court and finally to 
the Supreme Court, Mr. Teitiota’s application was dismissed.106 
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The identification of the prosecutor as climate, as the cause of the displacement in this case was 
the initial challenge. The Refugee Convention requires an identifiable, human actor to cause the 
harm. In addition, the persecutor must be a government actor or a non-state actor that the 
government is unwilling or unable to control. It is difficult to fit climate change into the persecutor 
mold.107 
Significantly, Teitiota identified the international community particularly the industrialized states 
as the persecutor responsible for causing two centuries of carbon emissions that contributed to 
rising seas and changing weather patterns. Rejecting this argument, the High Court found that the 
international community simply lacked any element of motivation to harm low-lying states like 
Kiribati. 108 
As for domestic protection, it is unlikely that their home governments will have abandoned them 
to the effects of climate change; in fact, governments are likely to assist them in coping with the 
impacts. Although it was acknowledged that the government of Kiribati was taking measures to 
adapt to climate change, he persisted in arguing on the inability and powerlessness of the state to 
stop the sea rise.109 
These arguments did not bring Teitiota under the Refugee Convention, however, because he failed 
to present any evidence that the government of Kiribati did not take adequate steps to protect him 
from such harm. 110 
Dismissing Teitiota’s argument that he was entitled to protection as an IDP, both the Tribunal and 
the High Court stated that the Guiding Principles do not apply once an individual has crossed 
international borders. Furthermore, the Refugee Convention by definition does not apply to IDPs 
simply because they are not “outside their country of nationality”. The Tribunal also pointed out 
that even if Teitiota had migrated within Kiribati instead of to New Zealand, he would not have 
been an IDP. Although there was “some degree of compulsion in his decision to migrate” Teitiota’s 
move was “a voluntary adaptive migration” and not “forced” as required by the Guiding Principles.  
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Although Teitiota’s claim ultimately failed, the High Court did not hold that Refugee Convention 
protections could never be extended to climate induced migrants. This leaves open the possibility 
that future claims brought by individuals fleeing climate change might prove successful.111 
 
Q. The Limitations of Judicial Responses  
Although litigation might be a tool that paves the way for future change, however in the meantime 
it is not considered a feasible option for most climate change-displaced persons. Not only is 
litigation a lengthy process with no guarantee of relief, it requires significant financial resources. 
Although Teitiota had access to an attorney who specialized in human rights law, that level of 
representation is scarce and costly to attain.112  
Even if litigation were to be successful, the legal weight of a judicial holding is not unqualified. 
Judicial interpretation may lead to the expansion of the interpretation of law, however, they should 
not be relied upon to provide protection for climate induced migrants.113 
In conclusion, the international legal system turns porous when it deals with climate migrants 
crossing an international border, protection is clearly absent, however complementary or 
humanitarian protection could arguably still be beneficial tools but lack coordination and more 
importantly sustainability. 
This chapter conceptualizes the problem of climate change, its related migration and the legal 
dilemma it imposes; the available options are nondurable. The international refugee law, the law 
on migration, international human rights law and customary law do not withhold the burden of 
protecting internationally displaced people due to climate change. 
From another angle, the following chapter will explore the ethical dimension of climate change. 
This phenomenon arguably invokes some ethical considerations when confronting man-made 
environmental changes; to mention considerations of fairness, equity, and justice.  
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The chapter will also present the different arguments that moral philosophers have articulated to 
support their proposition on why climate change is ought to be seen through a moral and an ethical 
lens. As well, it will explore the moral questions that climate change poses and most importantly, 






















III. Ethics, morality and climate change  
 
A. The Anthropocene revisited   
Recent study 114 published in Nature proposed an unsuggested date for the start of the 
Anthropocene that is way before the Industrial Revolution. The climate scientists, Simon L. Lewis 
and Mark A. Maslin suggested the year 1610 to mark the human interference with the climate. 
Tying that human intervention to this year may appear unusual, since it might not have certain 
significance and not necessarily connected to events that could have a relation to climate change.115 
However, for them, the year 1610 holds the potential to reshape the way we conceive the 
Anthropocene. 116 Geologists use a global marker; which they call the “Golden Spike” or “Global 
Boundary Stratosphere Section and Point” (GSSP) that marks a recognized division in the 
geological timescale by pinpointing the planetary material that justifies this divide. 117 
The year 1610, was particularly chosen as it was the lowest point in a decades-long decrease in 
atmospheric carbon dioxide. This change was caused by the death of over 50 million indigenous 
residents in the Americas, as a result of “exposure to diseases carried by Europeans, plus war, 
enslavement and famine” 118, during the first century after the European contact.119 By the  
mid-seventeenth century with the survival of only 6 million on both continents; a significant drop 
in farming, fire burning and human activities affected the carbon dioxide levels in the 
atmosphere.120 The proposal is unusual because of its uncommon suggestion of genocide as a 
golden spike for epochal division.121 While the Anthropocene debates may seem irrelevant; the 
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debate is highly alive because it concerns what kind of story to tell about the human impact on the 
planet.122 
On the other hand, there are also claims that suggest that climate change is simply too big to be 
seen. This is what eco-critic Timothy Morton terms a “hyperobject” which describes something 
that cannot be realized in any specific instance. The Anthropocene offers climate change a 
narrativity; a story rather than periodicity, and like any well-told story, it relies on conscious 
plotting and manipulation of feelings.123 
Some 124 insist that we are naming this story incorrectly, that “Anthropocene” obscures vital social 
and historical facts that must be addressed in any proposed solution. Not all “humans” are equally 
responsible for causing the messy situation we are currently in; nor are they perpetuating it at equal 
rates. They argue that naming a crisis after the species hides social histories of exploitation of both 
humans and nature, not merely geological histories. 125  
In sum, it would probably seem unfair if a phenomenon like climate change is linked to the human 
species as a whole. The Industrial Revolution arguably occurred because of the empire; a domain 
that was also connected to genocide, slavery and massive exploitation. Concluding that, the 
perpetuation of harm was not the same from all humans, but rather emanated from a small subset 
of the human species.  
B. Morality and climate change  
This chapter does not intend to propose answers to ethical questions that climate change poses.  
Rather it will carve out a space for this issue to be seen from a wider angle, and will also consider 
what could be the questions to ask when examining this conundrum.  
This chapter tries to explore how climate change does not only constitute a scientific phenomenon; 
rather also shed light on the ethical and a moral aspect to it. It will also discuss how climate change 
is related to the no harm principle on two respects: the first is of a theoretical nature that concerns 
individual ethics and morality and the second is of a legal one; looking at the no harm principle 
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within the international legal framework and its relation to climate change. Both aspects focus on 
the negative duties relating to the no-harm principle rather than the positive ones.   
Over the past twenty years, a number of moral philosophers have begun to wrestle with some 
profound ethical dilemmas over the phenomenon of climate change. They explore how 
anthropogenic climate change involves questions of good and bad, right and wrong and 
responsibility and blame.126 The interests in climate change as an ethical issue derives partially 
from the fact that morality is a key driver for human behavior both as individuals and collectives 
whether as families, communities, nations; it is what lies behind our actions and responses. We are 
concerned with right and wrong and about the intentions we see in the actions of others’. More 
importantly it looks at implications of our actions and the others’ behaviors with respect to 
questions of harm and justice.127 
From this stand, if climate change is perceived and recognized as an ethically-bound issue, it could 
be a chance, and arguably a good reason to believe that people will consider, and maybe, confront 
the causes of this problem. On the other hand, if people fail to identify the problem as such, this 
might be a significant barrier to effectively respond to the issue, both individually and 
collectively.128  
 
C. How is climate change seen as a moral issue?  
Those who see climate change as a moral issue have arguments to support this proposal. Moral 
philosophers propose two main arguments: the first sees that the atmosphere is one of the global 
commons, shared by all humans and provides life sustaining services to everyone on the planet. 
However, this resource is limited, and subject to depletion under certain circumstances. 129 
The second argument acknowledges the limited capacity of the atmosphere to absorb our waste 
gases. This second claim is especially important because, as Singer 130 suggests that the distribution 
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of that resource imposes certain ethical considerations as it involves the distribution of an already 
scarce resource.131 
In addition to these two arguments, there is a classic argument that accuses rich people of using 
more than their share of that global common. Overuse is not the only problem, the over-consumers 
harm poor people by contributing to extreme climatic events, proposes Jamieson. Jamieson slightly 
extends Singer’s argument by suggesting that past and present distribution of atmospheric use is 
unjust for two related reasons.132 First, some people who primarily live in developed nations have 
used and continue to self-appropriate more of the atmospheric commons than others have, whom 
he describes as poor individuals living primarily in developing nations. Second, such “atmosphere 
grabbing” has the very real potential to cause physical harm to many people including those who 
are not yet born. 133 In addition, the causers of harm have not compensated the harmed ones for 
past or present injuries caused by their actions.134 These arguments rely on the scientific 
assumption that climate change is in some sense anthropogenic in origin.135  
 
D. Climate change, is not like any other problem  
The problem of climate change is a unique one. The combined causes for its occurrence, the long 
intervals of time it stretches over and the uncertainty that generally ravels climate science makes 
it a phenomenon with exceptional dimensions. For some of these features make the proposition of 
seeing climate change as a moral issue difficult to realize.  
Jamieson identifies a number of features that describe this proposition. None of them is unique to 
climate change although they are more severe in this case than others; no other problem displays 
all of these features. However, packed together they show why climate change poses a one of a 
kind dilemma; as they pose challenge our commonsense moral notions of individual 
responsibility.136 
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The first feature that makes climate change different from other problems is related to the 
magnifying power of technology. Our simple daily acts such as starting a car or adjusting a 
thermostat have broader and more extensive reach than previous forms of transportation and 
thermoregulation such as walking and fire building. The extensive growth of technology, 
especially with the production and management of energy is responsible for this. Back in the day, 
people disrupted their local environments, now people have the ability and the power to alter the 
planetary that allowed the sustainability of human life. For the first time in human history, we can 
take large amount of carbon buried deep beneath the earth surface, and transfer it to the 
atmosphere. Conceptually, this is difficult for average people to conceive, this however results in 
severe changes to global climate.137 
The second feature is the spatial reach of climate change in relation to the acts that contribute to 
it. Climate change is a global phenomenon, and it is often described as location-insensitive; the 
location of the emissions that contribute to climate change has nothing to do with where the effects 
might materialize. The atmosphere does not care where the GHG emission has occurred, it 
responds in the same way whether it comes from the poles, the equator or somewhere in between. 
Although more than 90% of GHG emissions have happened in the Northern Hemisphere, some of 
the worst damage of climate change is expected to occur in the Southern Hemisphere. 138 
The third unique feature of climate change is the systematicity of the forces that give rise to it.  
A huge amount of attention is directed towards computing carbon footprints and arguing over the 
responsibility for emissions; yet the manipulation of the global carbon cycle is integral to the 
existing global community. 139 
Jamieson explains this concept in simple terms by giving an example for clarification. Coal is 
mined in Australia, shipped to China where it is burned in electrical generating plants, which is 
then used to power factories that produce products that are later consumed in Europe and United 
States. 140   
                                                          
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
 36 
Virtually, all these agents are in one way or another involved in manipulating carbon. However, 
the allocation of responsibility is unclear due to this dispersal of roles, and because some of the 
effects are more visible than others. Each of the contributors have a ready argument to off-load 
responsibility to someone else. Although it will be assumed that China is responsible for those 
emissions, because it is where the “act” of burning of the coal has happened.141   
Still, Australia acted as the extractor of the coal, and Europe and United States have both consumed 
the embedded-carbon products. One can argue, that the image of China as the carbon villain is a 
consequence of Europe and United States outsourcing manufacturing to China, consequently 
outsourcing their carbon emissions. 142  
Jamieson states that there is no clear winner in this argument; the assignment of responsibility is 
arbitrary and everyone in this cycle benefits in some way and in some other way suffers. Moreover 
this whole process is dynamic as the global economy changes. However, as long as economies are 
carbon based, the problem will persist regardless of which country has done what in this process.143 
The fourth feature that is not a new one, being that climate change is the world’s largest and most 
complex action problem. It is the largest in the sense that everyone – in a way– is a climate change 
contributor and virtually everyone will be affected by climate change. Climate change being the 
most complex has many reasons; these include the high degree of connectivity in the climate 
system and the non-linear nature of many of its relations, so as the buffers that exist in this system 
with regards to the actions and effects. 144 
The emphasis here is on the difference of scale involved the human action and the resulting damage 
caused. Aside from the scientific aspect of the carbon cycle, the outcome is that the carbon released 
in the atmosphere results in generalized warming. This affects the global climate system, which in 
turn affects the distribution, frequency and intensity of various meteorological events. 145  
These results can radically vary as mentioned earlier; predictions foresee flooding, certain areas 
will even be prone to invasion by mosquitoes as a function of changed temperature and rainfall 
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regimes.146 It is difficult to imagine that daily emissions travel up in the atmosphere and linger for 
an unknown period of time then suddenly damage something that we value. The implausibility and 
confusion of this scenario makes the problem itself more difficult to comprehend as it differs 
highly from textbook collective action problems. 147  
 
The fifth difference between climate change and other problems is the temporal scope and reach 
of GHG. These gases have different dwelling times in the atmosphere; some would linger for few 
years, others for millennia such as with some human made gases such as tetrafluromethane.  
The time horizons involved in the problem of climate change are flabbergasting; it is difficult to 
conceive how our contemporary way of living has left a mark on the planet that will persist for 
such a long period of time, much less to internalize this in decision making.148  
Garvey extends this thought by saying that our actions and the results of our fellow humans’, our 
parents’ and our grandparents’ will still be felt hundreds of years in the future. This is why, seeing 
rights and wrongs in this quagmire is not easy.149 
Over these long intervals of time, with millions of agents, doing millions of little actions all over 
the planet casually entangle and form a chain to raise sea levels and cause flooding of a village 
ruining crops and taking lives. There is a noticeable harm here, even though it may not be clearly 
seen by the average person. However, in the end whose fault is it? And who should hold the 
responsibility for what is happening? Who should have done otherwise? It will not be easy for 
people to hold themselves accountable for their microscopic contributions of those effects. Can 
people admit to themselves that their slow-motion contributions have caused a distant disaster to 
the environment? Does this action constitute a genuine wrong? Garvey, contends that maybe this 
declaration is exactly what we have to do: to admit our moral wrong in order to be able to take 
action on climate change. 150 
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E. Unequal share of produced harm  
Countries that have least contributed to climate change are the ones who are going to be massively 
harmed, yet the problem is of less gravity to the ones with major contributors. As per Jamieson, 
80% of global carbon emissions are caused by ten countries who - alongside their political leaders 
and executives of the world’s most powerful corporations - have disproportionate influence in the 
decision making process such as the allocation of resources available for different missions like 
adaptation for example.151  
On the other hand, the 42 Member of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) emit about 
½ % of Global GHG emissions. Yet, many of them will disappear under a rising sea.152 These 
islands are the most visible and notorious example of the unjust harm that is inflicted by rich 
countries. The very existence of their homeland is being threatened because of long development 
processes that they have barely contributed to.  
In sum, industrialized states, over a long period of time, are substantively changing the atmosphere 
in a way that will have tremendous effects on people in certain regions of the world. There is as 
well, a possibility of the extinction of the human race. In the meantime lies immense suffering. 
Adding to that, we are now carrying the burden of knowledge of which our ancestors were 
blissfully ignorant.153 This knowledge does not allow us to turn a blind eye towards this problem 
anymore. From this stance, the duty not to harm within moral theory follows. 
F. Thou shalt not harm other people  
To begin, it is important to mention that this paper is more concerned with the negative duties of 
the no-harm principle over the positive ones, because confining to those negative duties will keep 
the argument widely acceptable. Like that, the argument will still be accepted by the ones who 
reject the positive duties as they adopt only stringent negative duties not to harm. As well, the 
argument can still be acceptable to those who endorse imposed positive duties because, even by 
failing to invoke such duties, they are still not denied. 154 
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The idea of the duty not to harm other people is the core principle of universal morality; and it can 
be traced back in history to the Stoic philosophers. Modern liberal thought, however, is most 
usually associated with defending the harm principle.155 Adam Smith addressed the no harm 
principle in relation to self-interest stating that even if the benefit coming out of it is greater than 
the harm, an act of harm is not to be carried out: 
One must never prefer himself to any other individual; as to harm or injure that other to 
benefit himself, even though that benefit to the one should be much greater than the hurt 
of other.156  
Mill, by the same token, promoted the centrality of the no-harm principle over any other one, when 
it comes to certain aspects of human relations. He insisted that the moral principles prohibiting 
harm between individuals are more important than those related to benefit. One might not need the 
benefit coming from another person, however, will always need no to be hurt by another: 157  
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never forget 
to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom) are more vital to human well-
being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of 
managing some department of human affairs. 158 
According to Smith and Mill, avoiding harm is a central notion; duties of benevolence were also 
important even though they were less central.159  
 
G. Fault liability on moral agents  
Responsibility might be held on a moral agent’s actions provided that these actions have 
consequences on human beings on the one hand, and that one is offered alternatives from which 
they are free to choose on the other. The first thread might be regarded as a sufficient condition 
for moral responsibility, while the latter as a necessary one. The way human beings or moral agents 
have chosen to deal with the environment is the main reason behind the problem of climate change 
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and the problems stemming from it; these effects not only have grave effects on the environment, 
but also affect entire populations.160 
Generally, an agent can be at fault by violating a duty that is relevant to causing the harm. This 
happens when an intention of harm is there; the agent acts intentionally in a way that produces 
harm. As well, the agent can also act out of negligence by failing to take the precautions that a 
reasonable person might take; the result might be imposing an unreasonable risk of harm to another 
person.161  
Some argue that the way the world operates in, with regards to development is a main consequence 
of climate change; however this path is not unavoidable. Other means of progress can be employed, 
on the condition that moral agents feel an imperative to do so. The supporters of this opinion pose 
it that there is not only one way of interacting with the environment. This is debatable, since there 
are other patterns of progress available; this can be done by abandoning convenient lifestyles in 
favor of more moderate and less harmful ones. This might sound like wishful thinking; however 
this argument still endures. The fact that the consequences of each of these alternatives can now 
be estimated is the safest of grounds for moral responsibility to sprout.162 
According to some theorists, we are morally responsible only for those GHG emissions that 
involve fault on our part.163 As for the argument regarding ignorance of the effects of emissions; 
when our grandparents emitted GHG, they probably acted out of ignorance not out of recklessness. 
However, it is more difficult today to invoke this argument since we are all burdened with the 
knowledge of the consequences of our actions. Jamieson bluntly states that we, unlike our 
grandparents, are at fault for our emission. 164 
As for the troublesome question of who is responsible for taking action regarding the effects of 
climate change, Gardiner questions that if an action on climate change is morally required, whose 
responsibility is it? The core of the ethical issue is the allocation of the costs and benefits of GHG 
emissions and their abatement. On this issue, philosophers are virtually unanimously on the same 
page; their conclusion is that the developed countries should take the lead role in bearing the costs 
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of climate change, while the less developed countries should be allowed to increase their emissions 
in the foreseeable future.165  
Shue departs from “ideal theories” whose focus is on emissions in the abstract. His position stems 
from the observation that less developed countries need energy not emissions. He states that what 
we should do, is to alter the way we produce energy; fossil fuels do not have to be the dominant 
source. This cycle can be broken by competitive price alternatives for example; making fossil fuel 
an avoidable necessity. 166  
 
H. To whom are moral agents accountable?   
Virtually, in the context of climate change and in broader terms, moral agents are morally 
responsible to every other person, and also everything that is negatively affected by its 
consequences. Since the continuation of emissions of GHG is a strategic and a moral decision that 
aims to specific gains; by the same token, the actual or potential losses should also be equally 
considered. Therefore, the real question should be who is affected or burdened by climate change, 
or who might be so in the future. 167  
Some have argued that agents are morally responsible to their fellow humans, including future 
generations. Currently, entire populations live in areas that are extremely prone to submersion 
under sea water and losing their place of residence. As repeatedly stated, the worst affected 
countries with repercussions related to climate change are the least well off. 168   
As for the responsibility towards future generations, some argue that future generations - by the 
mere token that they still do not exist - cannot be considered as rights bearers, and they cannot 
partake as claimants of rights, by the same logic that they cannot be bound by any kind of duty to 
anyone. However, this does not mean that they can be excluded from moral consideration. 169    
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On the contrary, there are reasons behind why moral agents might consider making space for the 
future generations on the basis of the principles of respect of dignity, equal opportunity and overall 
wellbeing of the not yet born generations. Considering future generations is obviously an inherent 
feature and tendency of human beings and their behavior. Any moral statement that runs contrary 
to those tendencies is not what people would normally do. After all, there is a tendency in human 
beings to want to secure better opportunities and conditions for their off-spring.170 However, the 
question remains whether this argument can still endure when it comes to securing the wellbeing 
of the children of others, whoever they might be. Jamieson as well questions this argument stating 
that we may care about our children or our children’s children because we see them as our own, at 
the same time, although this concern may extend for a generation or two, it will rapidly give out.171  
Expanding on this idea, future generations are actually at the mercy of the decisions taken by this 
generation, and cannot do anything about it. They do not have a say in what their world will be 
like, thanks to our actions. We are inflicting harm on future generations by making the 
environmental conditions they face more difficult and more threatening. Arguably, the conditions 
for future generations will be worse than they are for us.172 This reflects severe unfairness from 
our side; we inflict this grief on people who are utterly at our mercy because they live beyond us 
in time. 173 
 
I. Why do not we start morally judging people?  
Generally speaking, we do not subject people’s actions to moral evaluation. This could be because 
we consider what people do as “their business” and belonging to their private sphere which is 
beyond our own moral reach.174 However, there are still times when our moral thinking is engaged 
when something strike as not quite right. Some other acts grab our attention because they are 
morally exemplary or beyond our call of duty. This may appear to moral theorists as naïve or 
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superficial and they would like to dislodge this way of seeing things, however this is more or less 
how most of people see things most of the time. 175  
People may believe that harm inflicted on others by the effects of climate change is perpetuated 
by previous generations or by other people living elsewhere. Thus, it does pose a moral dilemma, 
however it is not “our” moral dilemma. Recent findings 176 suggest that individuals work to avoid 
feeling responsible for climate change; by blaming others either for their contribution to it or 
inaction.177  
By the same token, there seems to be processes of socially constructed denial that allow life to 
proceed normally despite the devastating knowledge of harm to others by our very own conscious 
actions. Diffusion of responsibility, feelings of inefficacy and information processing, and 
countless psychological and sociological mechanisms may also be at play. As for people who deny 
the entire phenomenon of climate change, there is little or no reason for them to look into the 
ethical ramifications of the issue in the first place.178 
Recent work by psychologists such as Daniel Gilbert and Jonathan Haidt have shown that our 
moral conceptions are only loosely associated with the infliction of harm. There is no surprise in 
the fact that many people are morally appalled by harmless acts such as consensual gay sex or flag 
burning, however their moral compass seems to breakdown and they are unmoved by deaths 
caused in war or by environmental pollution. 179  
Haidt and his colleagues have claimed that considerations involving fairness and reciprocity, 
authority and respect, purity and sanctity in addition to considerations about the causation of harm 
are at the foundation of morality as conceived by many people. Since these considerations come 
apart, people deny that particular harm causing activities are within the moral domain, while also 
considering behavior that does not cause harm as bearing moral importance.180 
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Daniel Gilbert graphically brings these considerations to bear on the question of climate change in 
his discussion of these incongruences:  
Global warming doesn't put our brains on orange alert is that it doesn't violate our moral 
sensibilities. It doesn't cause our blood to boil (at least not figuratively) because it doesn't 
force us to entertain thoughts that we find indecent, impious or repulsive. When people feel 
insulted or disgusted, they generally do something about it, such as whacking each other 
over the head, or voting. Moral emotions are the brain's call to action. Although all human 
societies have moral rules about food and sex, none has a moral rule about atmospheric 
chemistry…. global warming is bad, but it doesn't make us feel nauseated or angry or 
disgraced, and thus we don't feel compelled to rail against it as we do against other 
momentous threats to our species, such as flag burning. The fact is that if climate change 
were caused by gay sex, or by the practice of eating kittens, millions of protesters would 
be massing in the streets.181 
 
To a great extent the difficulty in addressing these moral aspects of climate change is due to the 
novelty of such a problem and arguably the frailty of our moral consciousness. Viewing these 
aspects in moral terms requires revising our everyday understanding of moral responsibility as 
Jamieson states.182 However it can be argued that for decades we have avoided exactly the same 
collective action on moral issues with regards to other problems. Climate change is arguably a 
replay of other unresolved problems such as poverty. We have known about the horrendous effects 
of both and we chose not to adequately address them. Thus, it is not a matter of the problem being 
new; it is probably how our moral systems militate against recognition 183 of how social 
arrangements create danger, disease, and death.184 
When it comes to actions to be made, the fundamental distinction in the prevailing moral 
consciousness is between those who are morally suspect and those who are not. In addition, we 
see most people’s action – as stated earlier – outside of the domain of moral evaluation.185  
A paradigm of an act that is morally suspect is the one described as an individual acting to 
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intentionally harm another individual, with both individuals identifiable and both individuals and 
the harm are closely related in time and space. 186 
However, climate change is a matter that is far from being straightforward, as well as its causes 
and effects. It would have been easier to judge a situation if both the perpetrator and the victim are 
identifiable and they are both related in time and space; where everything seems to be clear and 
available for a moral evaluation. 187 
However, if these various dimensions of the situation are altered: time, space and the surrounding 
conditions we might find it more difficult to place the situation on a moral scale. It might still be 
a candidate for a moral evaluation despite variations in the factors that contributed to a certain act. 
However it cannot be as clear cut as the situation with relatively constant variables.188  
 
J. A lack of moral rectitude  
Garvey, states that the developed nations’ failure to do something regarding climate change 
actually amounts to an enormous moral wrong. The ones who can rightfully voice this view are 
the ones at the receiving end of the effects of climate change. Like Tuvalu, Antigua and Barbuda 
is one of the small island states that are in danger of being submerged with the rising sea levels 
resulting from climate change. Lionel Hurst, their Ambassador to the United States, gave a speech 
in 2002, at the International Red Cross Conference on Climate Change and Natural Disasters. He 
said a great deal in that speech, however those lines are worth special consideration:189 
We see a lack of moral rectitude by those who are in leadership positions, who know the 
consequences of their inaction, and yet insist that they will not act....[the] thirst for 
environmental justice must be cast in moral terms....It must be seen as good versus evil.  
 
Garvey proposes to take Hurst’s suggestion seriously, and thinking seriously of the possibility that 
the ones who are running the West are responsible for the kinds of evil that the Ambassador is 
talking about.190 
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K. A moral outrage and a moral storm  
As mentioned before, what adds even more complexity to the problem of climate change is its 
peculiar features that in turn pose substantial obstacles to our ability to make hard choices 
necessary to address it. Climate change is at a junction point of a set of global, intergenerational 
and theoretical problems. This convergences justifies naming it as a “perfect moral storm.” One 
consequence of the so called storm could be that even if the ethical questions of climate change 
could be answered, there might be a difficulty to act, for this storm makes us vulnerable to moral 
corruption as Gardner states. 191  
The problem can also be viewed as Garvey’s articulations towards the West's behavior as a moral 
outrage. This naming is justified from his point of view since they have contributed to unnecessary 
harm to others. This principle behind this conclusion is neither complicated nor difficult to grasp; 
simply, people ought to contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility for 
breaking it.192  
In his view, this conclusion is backed up by a principle as well: the greater the ability to do the 
right thing, the greater the obligation to do what is right. Garvey argues that this principle is 
uncontroversial. He gives as example that one would have some explaining to do if one walked 
past a drowning child and did nothing to help. One would have even a lot more explaining to do if 
one were a physically fit and well-trained lifeguard. 193 
Practically, ethical questions are a cornerstone to the process of making policy decisions such as: 
where to set a global ceiling for GHG emissions and how to distribute the emissions allowed by 
such ceiling. The setting of this ceiling will also depend on how we are willing to weigh our 
interests against the ones of future generations 194 and how emissions are distributed given the 
global gap depends, in part, on various beliefs about the appropriate role of energy consumption 
in peoples' lives. 195 
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L. Climate change and no-harm principle  
Even though climate change is considered the most important case of anthropogenic cross 
boundary environmental harm. Little consideration has been given to the no harm principle 
throughout the 25 years of international negotiations on climate change. Nevertheless, the 
responsibility of states is present when causing harm to the environment of another state;  
for Mayer this is not a negotiable concept as it is an indispensable corollary to the structure of the 
current international legal order.196 The no-harm notion is also a widely recognized principle of 
customary international law whereby a state is duty-bound to prevent, reduce and control the risk 
of environmental harm to other states.197  
While the no harm principle has been identified in international environmental law as a 
fundamental principle, it is not generally recognized in international climate change governance 
and rarely explicitly invoked in the formulation of international responses. 198  
Contemporary international law provides evidence of how shared understandings of harm and 
suffering have made it possible for different societies to reach an agreement concerning the 
essential features of a cosmopolitan ethic.199 Although this may be partially true, the international 
system has failed to realize nonlinear forms of harm that result in disasters like that of climate 
change and its entailing problems like displacement for example. It also provides an  
understanding - yet not enough understanding - to reach towards less straightforward phenomena. 
International legal conventions however, impose simple and straightforward responsibilities on 
states: compliance with prohibition of bodily or mental harm.200  
It could be argued that international prohibitions of harm suggest that states are not able to reach 
a particular conception of what is the “good” that they should collectively try to promote, however, 
they have succeeded in reaching a global moral consensus of certain forms of harm that should be 
eradicated from the international society. 201 
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However, the climate regime was largely built on a more ambivalent principle rather than 
developing the no harm principle: the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDRs). At the same time, it remains unclear what the grounds for differentiation are or the 
nature of the responsibility; either the causal responsibility arising from a wrongful action or moral 
responsibility for those more well off and more capable of helping the needy. 202 The exclusion of 
the no harm principle in climate change negotiations was an unavoidable result of a certain 
geopolitical setting; in which the more powerful and influential states can push towards what 
works for their best interests.203 As this principle does not have a strictly fixed content or clear 
status 204 and thus allowing room for flexible interpretation of obligations. 
The reluctance of developed states to admit causal responsibility for their activities that have 
resulted in climate change, has pushed the climate regime towards spontaneous state initiatives 
ranging from voluntary funding to the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 
rather than a strict legal regime that defines the rights and obligations as might be implied by 
notions of responsibility.205   
The emission limitation commitments of the developed states as prescribed in the Kyoto Protocol 
are not defined on their historical responsibility, but rather on their capacity related criteria, in the 
quest to mitigate climate change. The objective of mitigation differs in terminology and in 
substance from the obligation of a state responsible for a continuing internationally wrongful act 
to “cease that act”.206 By the same token, adaptation measures that consist mainly of aid projects, 
contrasts sharply with the restorative obligations of a state responsible for an internationally 
wrongful act. 207  
Adaptation policies are usually linked to the formulation of development policies, a matter that 
lies within the heart of a state’s sovereign rights. That is why the call for “country driven approach” 
to adaptation is not enough to protect the sovereignty of states when funding remains subject to 
conditions; like requirements to demonstrate the use of funds for adaptation purposes, to more 
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specific policies on the management of “climate migration.” Mayer states that the history of 
European colonialism retells the story of systematic interference although usually justified with 
good intentions. Leading to the imposition of political and economic agendas that are – to say the 
least – disadvantageous to the people concerned.208  
Expanding on this line of thought, Jason Hickel, describes how the rightful reparations that the 
West owes to the less developed nations have metamorphosed into “aid” as an act of charity and 
kindness towards the less fortunate ones. He states how the history of colonialism is being routinely 
erased. In spite of the history record of European colonialism keeps stirring up questions on this 
particular topic that they surely prefer to avoid. 209  
For Hickel it is not true that the Europeans are the ones who developed the colonies; it is actually 
the other way around, it is the colonies that developed Europe. The constant flows of resources 
from the colonies to the colonizers even contributed to the capital of the Industrial Revolution. By 
the early 1800s, a total of 100 million Kgs. of silver had been drained from Latin America and 
poured into the European economy. To get a sense for this wealth, if that deported sum of silver 
was invested in 1800 at 5% interest – the historical average – it would amount to the unimaginable 
sum of 165 trillion USD today.210  
This is the parameter of the economic system that was designed over hundreds of years enriching 
a small portion of humanity at the expense of the majority.211 This story makes the history of 
international development to a great extent false. Frankie Boyle sums it up by saying that even the 
charity we offer is patronizing. Instead of giving a poor man fish it would have been more sensible 
to stop poisoning the fishing water, kidnapping his ancestors into slavery and then showing back 
up hundreds of years later to talk nonsense about the fish.212 
Hickel concludes that there is no money that could adequately compensate for the harm done. 
However, he suggests that we would rather stop talking about charity and start acknowledging the 
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tremendous debt that the West owes to the rest of the world. While reparations per se are not going 
to turn the situation around, at least they would set the story straight. 213 
 
M. Breach of the No-harm principle  
A breach of the no-harm principle can be invoked when three conditions are met: a cross-boundary 
environmental damage; a causal relation with specific activities within the jurisdiction of a state; 
the failure of this state to take reasonable measures to prevent the harm. A breach of the no-harm 
principle entails secondary obligations for the responsible state to make reparations in response to 
an internationally wrongful act.214 
However, applying this to the context of global anthropogenic climate change does raise some 
technical issues. On the one hand, the parameters of the no harm principle are not clearly 
determined. On the other hand, issues regarding the definition of secondary obligation in case of a 
breach are also raised. This happens to be more complex due to the unique features of climate 
change previously mentioned: the simultaneous responsibility of multiple states, the scattered and 
indirect nature of the resulting harm, and the high complexity of the relation between greenhouse 
gas emissions and such harms. 215 
At the same time, there seems to be no good reason, at the most fundamental level, that the no 
harm principle cannot be applied to the GHG emissions, at least in the case of industrial states that 
have failed to take measures to reduce their emissions within their jurisdiction since the discovery 
of the human caused climatic changes decades ago. 216 
The consequences of climate change on individuals are not only indirect, but also remote and 
consequential. This is why as the no harm principle has develop in the context of transboundary 
environmental damages, it will be more challenging to determine the harm. How a natural disaster 
unfolds and, for instance, whether individuals need to migrate largely depends on a range of 
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political, social, economic, demographic and cultural factors in the country affected by the 
environmental impact. 217 
In sum, the morally required thing to do when it comes to a duty towards the harmed ones is a 
question of less not more. Ceasing the continuous infliction of harm is the most basic and morally 
direct thing to do. Shue summed up this conflict between richer nations and poorer ones by stating 
the following:  
Even in an emergency one pawns the jewelry before selling the blankets. . . . Whatever 
 justice may positively require, it does not permit that poor nations be told to sell their 
 blankets [compromise their development strategies] in order that the rich nations keep 
 their jewelry [continue their unsustainable lifestyles] 218 
In other words, whatever the interpretations of justice may require us to do, Shue suggests that it 
should not allow poorer nations to sacrifices their necessities, and put their development on hold, 
so that the richer ones can keep their extravagant and overly developed lifestyles.219 Poorer nations 
have the right to what he calls the “guaranteed minimum” when some people have less than enough 
for a decent human life, while others have more than they need. Ironically, the available resources 
are actually enough so that at least everyone has enough without stepping on the others’ turf; he 
stresses that it is unfair not to guarantee everyone at least an adequate minimum.220 
 
N. What is the correct “should” question to ask?  
Climate change certainly leaves us with myriad of difficult questions. Asking what we should be 
questioning is in itself another question. Should we be questioning, what the right thing to do is? 
Or should we ask what the right thing to do is, ethically? Or just what is the ethically convenient 
thing to do? Should we ask pragmatically what we are actually willing to do?  
Broome states that not all “should” questions are actually ethical ones, although climate change 
has some ethical questions worth raising; especially the question of what we should do. This is 
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because any emerging answer must first weigh conflicting interests among people. He sums this 
proposition up by saying that when interests conflict, “should” questions are always ethical. 221 
 
Many ethical questions as Broome states can be settled by common sense; with no need for 
sophisticated philosophy. To some extent, all of us face ethical questions regarding climate change. 
Mostly, people understand that they cannot do something to serve their own interest if it is going 
to harm another person; it is an elementary moral principle. 222  
Garvey states two approaches when looking at the ethics of climate change. The first one, which 
is the good news, is that human beings sometimes change course when they see that what they are 
doing is unbearably wrong. Thus the ethics of climate change can actually push us in the right 
direction. The bad news is that reflection on the ethics of climate change can get us into trouble 
too; mistakes are easy to make and sometimes unavoidable when thinking about right and wrong 
on a global scale. 223  
In conclusion, the accumulated layers attributed to the issue of climate change have proven highly 
complicated to unfold. The problem ranges from the beginning of the detection of the human 
intervention in the atmosphere causing climatic change, and its already complex unique features, 
to the legal and moral aspects of the problem which makes it uneasy to find solid ground on which 
to start the untangling process, not to mention to look for solutions. 
The relevance of the no harm principle to climate change is to a great extent evident. As the basic 
duty of the wrongdoers toward the wronged is simply to cease the harm, this has been proved on 
the ethical, moral scale and the legal one. From an ethical and moral respect, the idea of the duty 
not to harm is the core principle of a universal morality. As for the legal aspect, the no harm 
principle is a cornerstone of environmental law. It is also stipulated in various legal instruments 
and recognized as a rule in customary international law. A wrongful act as well invokes further 
duties; reparations for the harm done however have proven largely contested. 
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The lack of moral imperative has been proposed as one of the reasons for inaction. Climate change 
is a replay of the same crises of poverty, migration and refugees that need action on a global scale. 
Although how climate change is different from these issues is recognized, however the way it has 
been tackled lacks the same component.  
The reluctance to invoke the no-harm principle in previous international responses pertaining to 
climate change is indeed questionable. It is attributed however to geopolitical considerations and 
influence from more powerful countries over poorer and less influential ones. 
Clearly, sacrifices are going to be a part of any action concerning a solution for climate change, 
however for a change, maybe it is time for the more developed to compromise; theoretically an 
ethical outlook in this chaos may force such a space into being.  
However, as will be discussed ahead, sacrifices on the developed nations’ part, have not been part 
of the package during the deliberations and conclusion of Paris Agreement. The new promises 














IV. Paris Agreement, it's not what you think   
This chapter provides a brief assessment of the Paris Agreement which is the most recent and 
nearly universal deal carried out in the hope to tackle climate change. The evaluation focuses on 
two points; first, whether Paris Agreement adheres to the no-harm principle. The second assesses 
how it has dealt with the issue of climate migration and whether it has put forward any solutions 
for the affected populations.  
 
A. Diplomatic success?  
At the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (hereinafter COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Paris, an Agreement was reached 
by the international community which involved 195 countries.224 It is a legally binding treaty under 
international law, Paris Agreement entails an accompanying COP decision namely Paris Decision. 
The Agreement does not replace, rather complements the UNFCCC.225 
This understanding came into being after 25 years of continued efforts of climate diplomacy 
envisaging climate action.226 The Agreement has been celebrated by participants and the media as 
a turning point in policy making to address human induced climate change. 227  
At the same time, the Agreement – as much as it has been praised – has also been heavily criticized. 
In the following section, an assessment of how the agreement has failed to efficiently tackle the 
major issues that is said to cause climate change. Observing how an agreement with all that 
international weight and global consensus has been reached by removing almost all substantive 
issues concerning anthropogenic climate change. 228  
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B. Premature aspirations?  
On the upside, the Paris Agreement introduced a new notion that stresses the fact that “any global 
warming is dangerous”, this is in contrast to the UNFCCC, whose objective was to avoid merely 
“dangerous” climate change; thus implying a shift of conception of what could constitute a tangible 
danger.229 
The Paris Agreement negotiations witnessed the acceptance of more ambitious goals than before. 
These include holding “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C (Article 2).”230 
Not surprisingly, that pressures for 1.5°C target came mainly from the persistent pressure of Small 
Island States who had for years demanded that global warming be kept at 1.5°C to prevent the 
most severe climate change that could threaten their peoples. 231 
Paris agreement also earned the support of developing countries, arguably for two reasons. First, 
the agreement raises the standard of adaptation in the international climate regime. Actions of 
adaptation are going to be accelerated and to be taken under review every five years. Although 
there was recognition for the need for substantial adaptation finance in Paris Agreement; it still 
does not include collective and quantified goal for this.232 
The second reason, is the agreement’s recognition that some impacts of climate change are not 
going to be adapted to, rather they must be dealt with. This was a contentious issue until the end. 
As developing countries wanted the concept of “Loss and Damage” to be included in the final text, 
understandably the developed countries wanted it removed. For the reason that, they feared it will 
impose on them liability and compensation claims (Article 8; para 52 PD).233 Surprisingly, or 
possibly not, drafters came out with an innovative circumvention to go around this dilemma and 
please both parties; while the article of loss and damage of the Paris Agreement stays, the decision 
text also contains a clause that excludes the concept as a basis for compensation and liability 
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claims.234 In doing so, it pulled the teeth out of this mechanism and rendering it largely benign; 
favoring large emitters over the ones actually harmed.  
On the downside, many have pointed out shortcomings of this agreement, to state; the lack of legal 
binding-ness as far as national contributions relating to mitigation, adaptation and finance are 
concerned is one flaw.235 International action on climate change adaptation consists mainly of aid 
projects; that contrasts sharply with the obligations of a state responsible for an internationally 
wrongful act, which is another shortfall 236 not to mention its overall ambiguity of the text and lack 
of timely plans to pursue actions.  
In other words, the Agreement’s core legal obligations are mainly and merely procedural; there is 
no substance when it comes to actions or deadlines prescribed in the text. Nor are there specific 
mitigation actions or indications of which emission levels should be achieved by what deadline. 
Instead, the Agreement focuses on individual climate mitigation plans and the transparency 
framework.237 
Over the five year cycle, all parties will have to prepare nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs), report on implementation to account for their contributions and regularly enhance the 
plans in light of a global stock take.238 Developing countries do receive support for preparing, 
implementing and accounting for NDCs. 239 
Paris Agreement gives limited guidance on the content of those NDCs, and lacks actual plans on 
how to achieve the targets for emission reduction. NDCs of developed countries “should” be in 
the form of economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, and other countries are as well 
encouraged to move towards such targets. However, there is no agreement on the specificities of 
the types of neither targets nor actions. Though, an interim negotiation body is mandated to 
develop further guidance of the features of NDCs (Article 4.4; para 26 PD). 240 
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Moreover, there is no agreement on the side of parties on a common time frame for NDCs i.e. 
whether NDCs should all cover the same period. However, it seems that there is a lack of harmony 
in the timelines of most NDCs. In the run-up to Paris, different timelines are indicated; some up to 
2025 and some up to 2030, while some indicate a multiyear target others single year target. 
Unifying the timeline, or at least getting it close, will make the comparison process easier and will 
help in monitoring the collective progress towards the global temperature goal. 241 However this 
does not seem currently to be the case, leaving the matter up to the discretion of each individual 
state.  
On the dark side, contributions submitted by countries significantly lags behind the stipulated 
global ambition. Even if they were fully implemented, global temperatures will still most likely 
increase somewhere between 2.7 °C to 3.5 °C. 242 This is considered a major shortfall in the Paris 
Agreement. Actions to strengthen these contributions – especially by large emitters– must already 
start in 2018 in order to keep the world on what is considered a safe track for humanity.243 This 
shortfall was explicitly highlighted in the decision adopting the agreement, which “notes with 
concern” that the contributions “do not fall within the least-cost 2°C scenarios, rather these lead to 
a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030”, while also noting that for a 2°C pathway, 2030 
emissions would need to be reduced to 40 gigatonnes. 244 
Another shortfall of it is that an agreement concerned with climate change lacks the basic climate 
change causing factors. There is no mention of GHG sources, not even a remote mention of the 
use of fossil fuels, or the stopping of the expansion of fracking, shale oil or explorations for oil 
and gas in the Arctic and Antarctic.245 The absence of such crucial elements from an agreement 
this important is worrying and cannot be taken in good faith. The identified sources causing climate 
change are simply areas arguably deliberately missing. Presumably, that this is one of these 
contentious no-go issues that will get in the way of achieving a consensus from certain parties and 
otherwise would have jeopardized the achievement of this Agreement.  
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Spash states that the Agreement lacks a means of enforcement; it has “no teeth”. Article 15 on 
implementation and compliance establishes an expert committee that will be “non-adversarial and 
non-punitive”, in other words, nothing will be done in the event of non-compliance. 246  
Due to strong opposition to the compliance mechanism that is “to facilitate implementation of and 
promote compliance with the Paris Agreement” it remains to be seen whether it will be put into 
practice and how this is going to happen. 247  
Not only does the Agreement offer loose terms on compliance, it also provides an easy exit for 
those who are no longer interested; as seen in Article 28 withdrawal from the agreement is smooth 
and entailing no sanctions. 248 
In sum, the Paris Agreement maintains the prospect of dangerous anthropogenic interference in 
the climatic system. This means that it also confirms the shift in the international position from 
prevention to risk management in contradiction of the UNFCCC’s own remit. Spash continues his 
criticism stating “as if insurance has ever stopped a fire” implying that Article 8's promotion of 
“comprehensive risk assessment and management” and “risk insurance facilities, climate risk 
pooling and other insurance solutions” will not be enough of an insurance if a real disaster hits.249 
 
C. Climate migrants; off the negotiations table  
While the world celebrated the conclusion of an overly ambitious agreement on climate change, 
there was one urgent area where it did not go far enough: climate change induced migration. 
Migration is often called the “human face” of climate change yet it does not receive adequate 
international attention or proper resources to face it.250 It might be argued that climate migrants 
were deliberately removed from Paris Agreement as will be discussed ahead.  
As previously mentioned, the Paris Agreement keeps the triggers of harm in place; the text signifies 
commitment to sustained industrial growth, risk management over disaster prevention, and future 
                                                          
246 Id.  
247 Supra note 225 
248 Supra note 224 
249 Id.  
250 Kristin Lambert, The Paris Agreement: Spotlight on Climate Migrants Yale School of Forsetry and Environmental 
Studies (2015), available at https://environment.yale.edu/blog/2015/12/the-paris-agreement-spotlight-on-climate-
migrants/ (last visited Mar 26, 2017). 
 59 
inventions and technology as saviors.251 By maintaining the system that keeps the industrial growth 
at that rate, it sustains the continuity of harm to vulnerable populations. This can be seen in Article 
10 that states: “accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-
term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable 
development.” 252 
Spash on the other hand sees that the reduction of GHGs is necessary immediately; addressing 
climate change does not require new technology, and even if proven successful it will take decades 
to be well established, not to mention that time is a crucial factor in the matter of climate change, 
and a lot of it has already been wasted by decades of use of fossil fuel and inaction.253  
The first draft of the UNFCCC negotiating text for COP 21, released in February 2015, included 
a proposal to create a facility with the name “Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility” 
that was going to be assigned three roles: “provides support for emergency relief, assists in 
providing organized migration and planned relocation, and undertakes compensation measures” 
for persons displaced by climate change.254 Not surprisingly, there was little public information on 
the design of this facility and the functions it would fulfill.255 However, in the final text of the 
Agreement, the facility was absent. As Omer Karasapan justifiably questions whether this 
particular group of people was displaced from the Paris Agreement itself. 256   
It does not come as a surprise that the said facility was removed from the Agreement. This is 
largely due to the opposition of Australia, their proximity to low lying islands in the Pacific and 
these islands inhabitants’ vulnerability to these climatic changes surely played a role in their 
omission from the Agreement. While Australia spent millions of dollars on climate resilience 
projects in the Pacific and contributed 200 million dollars to the Green Climate Fund, 257 it could 
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not afford to lose the upper hand to deal with migration issues on its own terms. Understandably, 
having this facility in the agreement will make this mission more difficult. 
Australia is unlikely to be alone as the impact of climate change as human migration increases, the 
more powerful and those most responsible for global warming retreat from this facility to deal with 
climate change issues as they see fit.258 It was argued that the removal of that facility was short 
sighted. As it calls for organization and coordination of the movement linked to climate change, 
rather than the ad hoc measures that are usually taken in these situations when a catastrophe hits.259 
The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism was mandated in Article 8.3 
and 8.4; para 50 PD of the Paris Decision to establish a “task force” on this matter to “develop 
recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related 
to the adverse impacts of climate change” as mentioned.260 The establishment of a permanent 
institution; the Warsaw International Mechanism established in 2013 by COP 19 is said to be a 
major success for small island states. This mechanism is to discuss questions related to Loss and 
Damage, as per Article 8.2; para 48 PD, now it is anchored to the Paris Agreement and made a 
permanent institution.261 
There is little knowledge around this taskforce and its dynamics, as well as who it will be 
comprised of and how many states will make it up or whether groups of states will put someone 
forward to represent them collectively. Moreover, the taskforce was given a remit to “create 
recommendations” as vague as this term might be; it is still not clear how the said 
recommendations will be implemented or what weight they actually carry. Most importantly, the 
balance between vulnerable countries and high emitters is still unknown, so as the balance between 
sending and receiving countries. 262  
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In conclusion, George Mobinot hit the core over the propaganda made for the Paris agreement by 
saying that “By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle. By comparison to what it 
should have been, it’s a disaster.” 263 The Paris Agreement does symbolizes a legal and moral 
disappointment with regards to climate change induced migration at the international level. It was 
a careful attempt not to fall within the pits as of previous agreements on climate change. However, 
because this agreement tiptoed around contentious issues, it came out with shallow content under 
the cover of a glamorous façade.  
As far as this paper is concerned, problems with the Paris Agreement can be seen at two levels: 
the general context of the Agreement and the specific context regarding climate migrants. On the 
general level, ambiguity is used strategically in the wording of the agreement which allowed it to 
be passed, however to some extent it is severely lacking concrete approaches, plans and timelines, 
fundamental words like oil, coal or fracking related to energy use are absent. The only sentence 
that mentions energy is in the preamble acknowledging the need to promote sustainable energy in 
developing countries, in particular in Africa.264  
Invocation of the no harm principle cannot be seen within the Paris Agreement, since its presence 
would at least presume negatives duties of ceasing the act of harm that derives from emissions and 
since Paris agreement is lenient in that, then the triggers perpetuating climate change still endure, 
thus maintaining the possibility of harm to innocent populations. This does not include the positive 
duties for reparations that could oblige richer states to compensate harmed nations. This is 
presumably one of the major issues that richer countries want to avoid. 
The non-binding aspects of fundamental prospects of the agreement is a major problem; especially 
when it comes to the implementation of NDCs. As well as the elusive compliance mechanism and 
the easy exit from the agreement. It also lacks the sense of urgency that the phenomenon of climate 
change and its entailing repercussions demand.265 
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As for the specific issue of climate induced migration, a principal way the international community 
can address migration is by removing some of the triggers that make it necessary for people to 
flee, however it has chosen the language of adaptation and risk management over prevention.266  
The least that could have been done towards climate change induced migrants is an adequate 
recognition. Even though the idea of legal recognition or legal assistance might seem farfetched, 
due to the sensitivities arising from that issue. However the choice was going around the 
phenomenon. The climate change coordination facility was removed and the taskforce will only 
help in giving recommendations, and any direct mandate or a solid approach seems to have been 
dropped off the negotiation tables along with climate migrants.  
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V. Conclusion   
Climate migrants seem to have materialized a legal and an ethical dilemma produced by the effects 
of climate change. They have given a face to long history of legal and ethical inadequacy when it 
comes to solving not only the problem of climate change however many other problems that 
require a global action.  
Climate migrants have fallen through numerous existing gaps in the international legal instruments 
relating to human mobility. Instruments for protection in case an international border is crossed 
are not applicable in most cases of climate change induced displacement.  
The Paris Agreement has created another protection gap for climate migrants. The displacement 
facility that was going to directly target them was intentionally removed, and a taskforce was 
placed whose structure and role remain unknown. This ends up with the same distorted and 
unorganized protection for these populations facing a sweeping phenomenon. 
The no harm principle, being universal, governs a wide range of relations from simple human 
interaction to international relations between states, was discarded during the formulation of 
climate policies and the Paris Agreement is no different. This raises a lot of questions because 
although there is always contestation on what the “good” is to be done, there is consensus on what 
is the harm that should be refrained from. 
The Paris agreement was a continuation of the legal and moral failure that characterizes the system 
of governance regarding climate change. The results of these failures have been endured and will 
be endured by many. Climate migrants will suffer immensely; in some scenarios they will lose 
their subsistence and livelihoods, in others they could lose their own land. At some point the 
adaptation measures used as painkillers will no longer hold up to the approaching waves, the real 
problem will present itself when a right decision is reached and it is too late to act or we simply 
cannot act upon it because our vision towards the problem is distorted. 
Maybe the proposed painkiller might not be the remedy that the injured are looking for. Ideally, 
maybe it is a time for us to admit our moral wrong and stop talking about what needs to be done, 
and let the concerned ones on the verge-of-drowning speak for themselves. 
 
